Street scene in Yangon, Myanmar. Source: Basilstrahm’s flickr photostream, used under a creative commons license.
A Dispatch from Yangon on the Eve of Myanmar’s
Election
As I am writing this blog from Yangon, the November 8 election in Myanmar,
or Burma, is only a few days away. As a long-time foot-soldier of Myanmar’s
democracy movement, I view this historic election with both great enthusiasm
and deep concerns. I am hopeful that this election will bring the country to a
better future as the political parties try to implement promises made during
the election campaign. But I am also concerned about potential conflicts when
the great expectations built up during the campaign do not align with the
election outcome when the results are announced.
Since I arrived in Myanmar a few weeks ago, I have travelled around Yangon,
Mandalay, and northern Shan State. I have witnessed campaign activity by the
opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) and the ruling Union Solidarity
and Development Party (USDP) in the Yangon and Mandalay regions, but I saw
little activity in northern Shan State, where two Shan ethnic parties are very
strong. I have also met with the Union Election Commission (UEC) and many civil
society organizations, which are monitoring the elections.
Many people and political experts anticipate a landslide victory for the
NLD, based on seeing a sea of red, the color of the NLD, in the Yangon region,
but this does not reflect the situation in other parts of the country.
The media reveal strong biases. Newspapers owned by the government and the
military publish success stories of President Thein Sein’s government each day
who is often accompanied by the commander-in-chief of the armed forces Min Aung
Hlaing. Private newspapers publish news only about the two major parties, the
NLD and the USDP, while smaller parties do not receive much attention. The
private media mostly highlight negative views about USDP candidates, while
writing favorably about the NLD.
The UEC is the target of criticism by all parties (political parties, civil
society organizations, domestic election monitors, candidates, the media, and
voters), for a raft of problems, including the inaccurate voter list, advance
voting, voter education, polling station locations, and the code of conduct for
election monitors Yet, in my opinion, the UEC is surprisingly patient and
responsive to all criticism. It appears to have followed much of the advice
provided by its foreign partners, including foreign embassies and civil society
organizations, to implement international standards for organizing this
election.
Registering voters’ names is now digitized rather than handwritten and
therefore there are many mistakes in entering the data due to inexperience.
Voter lists are now arranged alphabetically, instead of by the address of a
household, based on a software program provided by a foreign partner, and
therefore different members of the same family will have to vote in different
polling stations. The commission is blamed for not referring to the 2014
national census when it produced the voter list, and many people refuse to
acknowledge the UEC’s explanation that the census used codes and did not record
birth dates or the names of people who were away from home at the time of the
census.
Most of the NLD candidates are young, well educated, inexperienced, and
unknown. The fact that they are unknown is a serious problem for the party’s
election prospects. The NLD’s headquarters in Yangon rejected many candidates
submitted by township branches and picked candidates of its own instead. As a
result, many NLD candidates are not locals and are unknown in the districts
they are seeking to represent. This has led to some fracturing within the party
as independent candidates emerge who get support from local NLD offices without
getting support from the party’s top leaders. In some cases local NLD branches
are unwilling to campaign for the candidates appointed by the top. Further,
some NLD candidates are former members of the military, police special branch
(intelligence), and military-owned business entities that have allegedly been
involved in human rights abuses, such as land confiscation.
On the other side, most USDP candidates can be categorized as old,
well-educated, experienced, and well-known. Being well-known is often
double-edged. Many are well-known for their arrogance, ignorance, corruption,
human right abuses, and links to the military regime. Some are well-known for
their reform mindset and positive contributions to society. Regardless, the
USDP has an incumbent advantage: strong finances, alliances with some ethnic
groups, and the support of the military and civilian-militias. In addition, a
powerful nationalist Buddhist grouping, the Organization to Protect Race and
Religion, or Ma Ba Tha, is on the ruling party’s side.
In Myanmar, I believe swing voters make up about 30 percent of the eligible
voters in every constituency and will play a critical role in deciding the
election. I find quite a few people do not care about the election. For
example, staff at each of the hotels I have stayed at have told me that they do
not know how or where to vote. Many have not seen the voter list and no one has
come to explain the voting process.
Based on these observations, I do not anticipate a landslide victory for the
NLD. In a campaign speech, Aung San Suu Kyi asked people to vote for the NLD,
without looking at the candidates and said that she will take action against
any who fail to serve for the people. Many people feel that this promise is
irresponsible and unrealistic. A few months ago, the NLD took disciplinary
action against one of its representatives in the lower house of parliament. The
politician responded by switching to another party, showing that Aung San Suu
Kyi can dismiss representatives from her party, but once elected they will
remain in office until the end of their term.
A big concern here is that the military may not accept a possible NLD
landslide victory. This is a reasonable concern, but I believe that the
military will accept Aung San Suu Kyi as the chairperson of the lower house and
as a member of the powerful National Defense and Security Committee (NDSC).
They may also accept one of the vice presidents coming from the NLD. In the
11-member NDSC, the military already has enough seats (six) to retain a
majority. There are also not many policy differences between Aung San Suu Kyi
and the military. She has already promised to help the military modernize and
reach professional standards. The military will be happy to increase the budget
for health and education to satisfy Aung San Suu Kyi, and recognizes that
having (and constraining) her in the power structure is most beneficial for
their interests.
The biggest concern is: what if Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters do not
accept the outcome of the election? The NLD may have largest number of seats in
the both houses, but this may not translate into winning the presidency for the
NLD. What will happen if the results of the elections do not match the great
expectations? Those are the big questions as people in Myanmar prepare to vote
in what could be the most open elections in the country in 25 years.
Mr. Aung Din is a former political prisoner in Burma and currently lives
in the United States. He serves as a consultant for Moemaka Multimedia, based in San
Francisco, and as an adviser to the Open Myanmar Initiative (OMI), a non-profit
organization based in Yangon that promotes the right to information and
education. See more information about OMI here.
