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Wednesday, June 29, 2011

Oral Presentation before House Subcommittee, June 22, 2011









U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific


Hearing on Burma:

“Piercing Burma’s Veil of Secrecy: The Truth Behind the Sham Election and the Difficult Road Ahead”

June 22, 2011

12:30 PM, Rayburn House Office Building Room 2172

Testimony of Aung Din
Executive Director, U.S. Campaign for Burma

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UNCHANGED BURMA

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Faleomavaega and Members of the Subcommittee,

Thank you very much for holding this hearing today. I have submitted my prepared testimony for the record. I also would like to submit the resolution on Burma adopted by the UN Human Rights Council in March 2011, which Daw Aung San Suu Kyi made reference to in her message, for the record. And here, I would like to raise one important issue that is bothering me too much.

For many years, the international community has tried to stop human rights violations in Burma, perpetrated by the military regime. The United States, EU, Australia, and Canada have employed economic sanctions on the regime as forms of pressure for positive change. Many years have passed and they began to doubt that imposing sanctions and pressure alone is not enough, and therefore they started to engage with the regime directly. I support the United States policy of engaging with the regime while maintaining sanctions. But, as I have reminded from the beginning, engagement should have a time frame, clear benchmarks and it should involve an appropriate measure to respond for any development. However, as of today, the existing sanctions are still not fully implemented yet, the engagement remains open ended, and I don’t see any effort by the U.S. government to exercise the pressure in a more effective and well-coordinated way.

The regime knows very well how to manipulate the current form of engagement.

From the beginning, the regime took the upper hand by withholding the issuance of the visas. They will not reject applications for visas flatly. They will make some excuses such as “Oh, our leaders are now very busy and they may not be able to host you appropriately. Please try again later.” Those diplomats who are eager to visit Burma have no choice but to wait for indefinite period or find someone who is close to the regime for help. While waiting for the visa, they will try to refrain from criticizing the regime publicly. This can be called “Visa Blackmail”.

After delaying weeks or months, the regime issues visas for the diplomats. Then the regime will try to control their schedule. The visas will only allow for a two or three day stay in the country and the regime will make them to spend most of the time at their Capital, Nay Pyi Taw, for meetings with several officials. The diplomats will not have much time left to see the opposition leaders. This can be called “Schedule Control”.

The next and important steps of the regime are making “Hollow Promises” and selling the story of “Reformers Vs Hardliners”. In most of the meetings with the regime leaders, the diplomats will not have much chance to raise their concerns - rather, they must listen to long and often needless lectures from them. At the end of the meeting, the regime will make some promises, such as “we are planning to release some prisoners” or “we will consider to allow the ICRC to visit prisons”, etc. Then, the diplomats will meet some officials who will actually listen to them. The diplomats will be amazed by the good command of the English language these officials possess. Then they will be amazed more as the regime’s officials hardly argue or deny the complaints they make about the human rights situation. They will be told by the officials, “we know there is something wrong in our country, we want to fix it and we want to make changes, but there are hard liners within and above our ranks”. Then they will tell the diplomats to give them time. It might sound like this, “You know you need to understand us and give us some time. Don’t put so much pressure on us. If you continue to do so, we cannot convince the hard liners to make the change. And don’t forget your Aung San Suu Kyi is also very stubborn, a hard liner herself.”

Many diplomats have bought such story right away. They heard some promises from the regime’s leaders. They found some reform-minded persons within the murderous regime. They were very much encouraged. That’s why when they came back from Burma and reported to the respective government and organization, their message is “We need to give them some time to implement what they have promised and for reformers to be able to convince the hardliners to do positive things.” They also claim that “This is not the right time to impose more pressure”.

These four steps, “Visa Blackmail”, “Schedule Control”, “Making Hollow Promises” and “Selling the story of Reformers Vs Hardliners”, have worked very well for the regime over the years. They have been successful in diluting and confusing the international diplomats by responding to their engagement with such a tactic. Unfortunately, and unintentionally, the international community has made the regime stronger and the democratic opposition weaker by legitimizing the regime, waiting for hollow promises, and doing nothing while waiting. Now, expectations are high again among the diplomats that some elements in the so-called new government are reform-minded, that they deserve to be given time and that putting more pressure on the regime now is not a good idea. For these diplomats, there will never be “a right time” to impose more pressure on the regime.

Mr. Chairman,

Please help us to end the “Open-ended Engagement Policy” and “This is not the Right Time Attitude”. The world has given the regime plenty of time. Now is the time to support and strengthen the democracy movement by weakening the regime stronger and harsher.


Thank You.


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